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ABSTRACT

FACTORS THAT PRODUCED DEFEAT OF BOND ISSUES AND THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY ADMINISTRATORS OF FOUR CALIFORNIA JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICTS TO OFFSET THOSE FACTORS ARE PRESENTED IN THIS PAPER. RELEVANT FINDINGS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES ON SCHOOL BOND ELECTIONS ARE SUMMARIZED; THE LEGAL AND FISCAL CONTEXT IN WHICH NEW CALIFORNIA JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICTS OPERATE IS DESCRIBED. A SUMMARY PRESENTS THE ISSUES AFFECTING THE SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL BOND CAMPAIGNS IN THE FOUR DISTRICTS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FINDING OF THE STUDY WAS THE DEGREE TO WHICH CALIFORNIA'S NEW DISTRICT OVERRIDE TAX LAW INFLUENCES THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICTS. SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OTHER NEW DISTRICTS CONTEMPLATING BOND ELECTIONS ARE BASED ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY. NOT AVAILABLE IN HARD COPY DUE TO MARGINAL LEGIBILITY OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENT. (MS)

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WINNING A JUNIOR COLLEGE BOND ELECTION:

HOW TO CHANGE THE VOTERS' MINDS

Case Studies of Four Newly Formed Junior College Districts that Passed a Bond Election After Suffering at Least One Defeat

A Seminar Paper
on Junior College Administration
Submitted to
Dr. B. Lamar Johnson

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE AND APPROACH OF THE STUDY

The late Phil H. Putnam, one of the great leaders of the junior college movement, once said:

> "Our junior college financing laws are based on the naive assumption that when the people vote to have a junior college, they will also vote to pay for it." (16)

If this is naivete, then the law must indeed be naive, because financing is often the gravest problem that confronts the founders of a new junior college. There have been instances where a founding president was given all the money he needed to acquire a site, build a college, and recruit a topnotch staff, but such cases seem to be the exception.

More commonly, one of the most crucial and difficult tasks facing the founders of a community college is a campaign to win an adequate financial base. Sometimes a well-run bond or tax election campaign produces the needed funding on the first try, but all too often, Putnam's observation has proven accurate: the same voters who cast ballots in favor of having a junior college decide to vote against paying for it.

This paper focuses upon the resulting dilemma: we will study the things a new junior college district can do to change the voters' minds. We will examine the cases of four California junior college districts that suffered from one to three successive bond election defeats before the voters were convinced to provide the needed funds to build a college in their communities. More specifically, we will

study the decisive factors that produced the initial bond defeats and the actions administrators of the four districts took to offset these factors.

This is the era of the nationally advertised "taxpayers' revolt;" more than half of all bond issues proposed by California school districts last year were rejected at the polls. Even the problem of paying current expenses is reaching crisis proportions for all levels of public education: new junior college districts in need of capital outlay funds have no monopoly on fiscal troubles. However, the four new junior college districts in this study have all passed large bond issues in communities that were not initially hospitable to the idea of such a bond issue. A full discussion of the "taxpayers' revolt" is beyond the scope of this paper, but the author hopes that this summary of the experiences of four junior college districts will be useful to other school districts planning a bond election.

If a full discussion of the broader fiscal dilemma facing public education is beyond the scope of this paper, so too is a large empirical study of junior college bond elections across the country. The author makes no claim that his observations can be generalized to other junior colleges with statistical confidence--there was no attempt to draw a random sample here.

Instead, this was a purposive sample suitable for a set of case studies. These particular junior college districts were selected because: 1) they have recently passed

bond elections after at least one defeat (we could only identify four districts in California that met this basic requirement of our study); 2) all four, being in California, have faced the same legal and fiscal constraints in their efforts to become established; 3) they were all accessible for a study such as this; and 4) the author has had unique opportunities to function as an impartial observer during the bond-passing days of two of the districts.

During the years when the Rio Hondo Junior College District was forming, selecting a site, planning a campus, developing a program, recruiting a staff, and passing a bond issue, the author was the staff writer covering the district for the local daily newspaper. As a result, the author attended more than 50 Rio Hondo board of trustees meetings over a two-year period, spent many hours discussing the new college with its officials and lay people, and wrote a great many news stories about Rio Hondo.

The author was also on hand in his capacity of local newsman during Mt. San Jacinto College's climactic fourth bond election campaign. As editor-in-chief of a daily newspaper in Mt. San Jacinto territory, the author covered more than a dozen of this district's board meetings, spent hours talking about this college with its officials and laymen, and once again generated many inches of news copy about a junior college and its need to pass a bond issue.

To supplement this background, the author has conducted

a series of new interviews this summer, specifically for this paper. In addition to his conferences with personnel of the two Southern California junior colleges included in the study, the author drove to Fremont (in the San Francisco Bay Area) to interview the president of Ohlone College. A schedule conflict made it impossible to meet with San Joaquin Delta College officials during the same Northern research trip, but the author did complete a 45-minute long distance telephone call to obtain some of the data about the San Joaquin district's bond elections.

Because of the author's strong interest in junior college bond elections, an exceptional amount of time and effort went into researching, organizing, and writing this paper. In order to make this possible during a single 10-week quarter at UCLA, the author was obliged to merge the requirements of two classes and submit term papers based on this material to both. We trust the reader will share our conviction that the scope of this project justifies this procedure.

Before we leave the subject of methodology, we should clarify one of the basic assumptions implicit in this study. We have assumed that the changes in bond election outcome we studied resulted from changing voter perceptions of the four junior college districts. Such changes in election result could also be produced by other variables, such as a major shift in the demographic character of a district. The author's judgment is that no such changes occurred in the interim between bond elections in any of the four districts; we feel justified, therefore, in assuming that the variable we will discuss is in fact the variable that produced these changes in the vote.

II. SOME PREVIOUS FINDINGS ABOUT BOND ELECTIONS

Since school bond elections have been the subject of much empirical research, it would be inappropriate to begin our case studies without first noting some relevant conclusions of this research and developing a few hypotheses based on them.

In a study of 1054 school districts, Carter (3) found that the national average turnout for school financial elections approximated 36.3 per cent of the eligible voters, and that as the turnout *increases* from this mean, the success rate begins to *decline*. In general, Carter found that the mean voter turnout at successful elections is significantly lower than the mean turnout for unsuccessful ones. Carter concluded that, while elections that attract large turnouts are often unsuccessful, a low turnout does not assure success, and a high turnout may not be threatening if the school campaign workers identify pro-school voters and particularly encourage these individuals to vote.

Supporting Carter's conclusion, Bush and Deutschmann (2) found that the most pro-school voters are likely to vote in a financial election, and that a greater turnout may reduce support for the issue because the non-voters and people identified as "no" voters in school elections exhibit quite similar attitudes and characteristics.

Boskoff (1) agrees, suggesting that the higher the

turnout for a bond issue, the less the probability of a favorable vote. In addition, a heated controversy, while it increases the voter turnout, will very likely hurt the chances for a successful bond election, he says.

A number of researchers have studied the socio-economic status and typical attitudes of persons who support bond issues, as opposed to those who oppose them. Jamieson (6) found that Democrats and younger persons are more inclined to support a bond issue than are Republicans and older voters.

Carter (4) supports Jamieson's findings, noting that younger voters (especially those with children in school) are more likely to vote yes on school bonds. He also reports that new residents and skilled or clerical workers tend to be "yes" voters, while longtime residents, those without children, and professional persons are more hostile to the schools. But Carter also found that one third of the voters feel they have little to say about school affairs, and two fifths feel educational policy is too complex for them to understand!

King (8) found that older, less educated persons, blue collar workers, and those over 50 tended to vote "no" on bonds.

In his recent doctoral dissertation, Turner (11) concluded that his "below average" communities were far ahead of other communities in the percentages of "yes" votes they produce, but that low voter turnout in such communities tended

to offset this factor. Turner's "average" communities were most hostile to school bonds, while the "above average" communities approached the proportion of "yes" votes delivered by the "below average" areas, but with much higher voter turnout levels.

Turner also found that the reward of a new building significantly increased the percentage of "yes" votes a neighborhood would deliver, and that 57 per cent of all communications about a school bond election reached the voters through personal contact with friends, neighbors, co-workers, and relatives. Nevertheless, he found, it is not possible to change basic attitudes about the schools during a campaign, so it is desirable to contact mainly voters who are known to be sympathetic to the schools. Among the campaign techniques studied, Turner found that the neighborhood canvass (P-TA march) was effective only in "above average" communities, while small group meetings significantly increased the percentage of "yes" votes only in "average" communities.

Carter (4) concluded that the news media and personal contact were the prime channels for communication about school elections, but he warned that: "There is nothing to indicate that communications have any lasting effect on attitudes, other than to reinforce those already held." (4:16)

Furthermore, Carter said, "communicatory behavior (by schools) in itself is not the answer, for that too would be

largely ignored by those for whom it was intended." (4:17)

Carter recommends that school officials make themselves as available as possible for personal contact with the voters, a suggestion heartily endorsed by Turner (11).

Turner also suggests that bond elections be held during the school year, that lay citizens' advisory committees be employed, that schools obtain lists of parents who are registered voters and contact them personally, that all possible pro-school people be identified, and that P-TA marches and small group meetings should be used when effective.

Turner says the California requirement of a two-thirds majority for passage of a bond issue is unduly stringent (a conclusion almost all school officials and at least one California court would support at this point), and he advises bond campaign leaders to appreciate the importance of the news media and the role students can play in a successful drive. (The two-thirds requirement and a suit challenging it will be discussed further in section III.)

Despite the difficulty of winning a bond election in California, it is ordinarily to a new junior college district's advantage to finance campus development through a bond issue, as Johnson points out (7:51).

Drawing on our findings from the literature, we can now compile a list of 'a priori' hypotheses about the outcomes of bond elections in the four junior college districts under study. We recognize that hypothesis-testing in the

statistical sense will not be possible on the basis of our purposive sample of four districts, but nonetheless, we will be interested in whether our findings are consistent with the conclusions of previous workers in the field. Based on the material just summarized, we would predict that:

A) The chances for passage of a bond issue will be improved if pro-education individuals and groups can be contacted personally by college personnel, including administrators, faculty, and students;

B) The chances for a bond issue to pass are better if neither controversy nor vocal opposition emerges;

C) A high voter turnout reduces the chance of passage, and unselective get-out-the-vote drives are not particularly good techniques;

D) Securing the support of the mass media and influential groups will improve the chances for passage of the bond issue;

E) New suburban communities with many young families will be more likely to pass a junior college bond issue than will older communities with many retired persons and few young people.

III. THE LEGAL AND FISCAL CONTEXT FOR NEW DISTRICTS

Although California has traditionally had the nation's leading junior college system, the junior college movement has yet to penetrate all areas of this state--and even today there are a few islands of "free territory" remaining. All four of our sample districts were carved at least partly from "free territory," so a look at the legal and fiscal basis for this so-called "free territory" is necessary at this point.

Junior college "free territory" is by no means free,

although die-hard junior college foes have often mistakenly assumed that it is. Students residing in such areas (i.e. areas not included in any junior college district) are normally entitled to attend any nearby junior college, but their education is definitely not free to the local taxpayers. The full current cost of such students' education--plus a rather exhorbitant $300 "seat tax"--is placed on the property tax bills in a given county's "free territory" as county-wide junior college tax.

Unfortunately, this tax has not always been clearly labelled on the tax bill, and new junior college districts have sometimes encountered difficulty in convincing some taxpayers that they have been paying for local students' junior college education all along.

Acting on the philosophy that the opportunity to attend a community college should be maximized in all areas of the state, the California legislature has passed a series of laws designed to propel all areas of the state into junior college districts. These laws have set up mandatory procedures for developing local junior college district organizational plans (and for bringing them to the people for a vote) by certain deadline dates. In addition, the "seat tax" was deliberately set at $300 per student per year to create an economic impetus for "free territory" communities to form or join junior college districts, according to Putnam (16). It doesn't cost an established junior college

anything like $300 per student per year to provide the space occupied by "free territory" students. In fact, this provision in the law has created a significant capital outlay windfall for junior college districts contiguous to "free territory."

However, the seat tax provision often compounds the problem facing a new junior college district, because the new district must ordinarily continue to send students out while developing its own campus. And this campus development may progress slowly, especially when the people who voted to have a junior college subsequently refuse to pay for it, as Putnam observed.

In this respect, California law is less than convenient for a new district. If a bond election to build a junior college could be conducted simultaneously with the election to form a new district, this tendency for the voters to say, "yes, we want a junior college," but "no, we won't incur debts to pay for it" would probably be diminished.

Of course, the basic California requirement of a two-thirds majority for passage of a local school bond issue compounds the problem (especially since a simple majority is all that is required to form a new district). California is one of only four states still requiring a two-thirds majority for a local school bond issue to pass. It is interesting to note that of the 175 school bond elections held in the state last year, only 79 gained the ...

needed 66.7 per cent support--while 158 of the 175 received a simple majority.*

On the other hand, California law does provide one form of relief for the new junior college district--and this relief has proven itself to be a prime force that leads to the ultimate passage of bond elections in new junior college districts.

Under the law, a new district is authorized to levy the usual junior college tax rate of 35 cents per $100 of assessed valuation (plus several smaller overrides for specific purposes), but in addition, it may levy an excess tax up to the level of the county-wide rate that was in force the last year before the new district was formed. This is a supplemental override to cover the costs of leasing buildings and sending students out of the district.

An important feature of this permissive override is that the tax may be levied for three years <u>after the new district wins a bond election</u>. Originally, this override was authorized only for the new district's first three years of operation, without reference to the success or failure of bond elections, and junior college foes could adopt a delaying strategy. Thus, if a new district could not pass a bond election

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*In a recent Yuba County case, a Superior Court judge ruled that California's two-thirds majority requirement is a violation of the constitutional one-man, one-vote principle. The judge held that a bond issue that received 57 per cent yes votes had in fact been approved. However, this ruling is under appeal, and the two-thirds majority rule is still in force at this writing.

and get its campus built within three years, a real fiscal crisis would confront the district. But as the law reads now, the new district can levy this large (and painful) override tax indefinitely if the voters persist in rejecting bond issues. This is indeed a compelling argument for a yes vote in a bond issue, because bond advocates can say that it actually will cost more NOT to have a bond issue and that the bond issue will eventually LOWER taxes.

IV. FOUR NEW DISTRICTS: CASE STUDIES

Having introduced our subject, summarized some relevant findings from the literature, and presented the contextual framework in which a new district operates, we will now proceed to summarize our case study findings. A graphic summary of the crucial issues affecting the successful and unsuccessful bond campaigns in all four districts is presented as Table I.

A. The Rio Hondo Junior College District

In 1960, the trustees of the Whittier Union High School District called a special election to determine if the voters of the area wished to form a junior college district. In this election, held Oct. 25, 1960, the people of the Whittier-Pico Rivera area voted 71.02 per cent in favor of forming a new junior college district, thus abolishing one of the last and

largest chunks of "free territory" in Los Angeles County.

At the time, several thousand young people from this area were commuting to neighboring junior colleges, including Cerritos, Fullerton, East Los Angeles, Pasadena, Long Beach, Compton, Orange Coast, and Mt. San Antonio.

Since the new junior college district shared co-terminous boundaries with the Whittier Union High School District, the high school board and administrative staff received the added responsibility of functioning as a junior college board and staff.

In addition to the problem of paying the tuition and seat tax costs for 4,000 students, the new district had several other major problems at the outset. For one thing, the high school board and administration were preoccupied with some very pressing and controversial unification and high school expansion problems.

"Heber Holloway (the high school superintendent) is a good man, but he just didn't have enough time for the junior college," recalled Judge Merton G. Wray (I5), a veteran high school and junior college board member.

"Our strength was just too divided in those days," Wray added.

The second problem took even longer than this one to solve. As an older city with a well-established private college, Whittier had a nucleus of hard-core public education foes. The role of Whittier College officials

in the junior college bond campaigns was never explicit, but it was not until the fourth (and successful) bond election that Whittier College declared itself "neutral" and went on record as "not opposed to" the junior college.

"We just had a bunch of people in Whittier who per se didn't believe in public education," Wray said.

The high school board and administration selected no site for the junior college, announced neither building nor curricular plans, and hired no full time junior college staff members, but they did call bond elections.

The first of these bond elections, held April 18, 1961, elicited only a 56 per cent yes vote. The second was held on Oct. 24, 1961, and drew almost 66 per cent yes votes (it fell 571 yes votes short of passage), and the third, held April 3, 1962, dropped back to a 63 per cent yes vote. The first two elections sought voter approval of a $15 million bond issue, while the third asked for a $12 million authorization.

It is interesting to note that, while the number of yes votes for these three bond issues ranged from 8,499 to 13,117, the "no" vote was nearly constant, varying only from 6,733 to 7,285 (one ninth of the range of the yes vote totals).

The turning point for the junior college district probably came in early 1962 when the high school board was forced to relinquish control over it. Under California law, a high school board was then permitted to maintain control

over a junior college district, but only if the two districts shared co-terminous boundaries; this condition ceased to exist when Pico Rivera residents voted to create the new El Rancho Unified School District, slicing off a portion of the union high school district that remained in the junior college district.

On April 3, 1962 (the same day as the third bond election), an election was held to select the first separate board of trustees for the newly autonomous Whittier Junior College District. A total of 19 persons ran for the five seats, including a slate of conservatives who were outspokenly hostile to the junior college movement. Only one of the most conservative candidates was elected, however, and four persons who held an assortment of more moderate views could effectively outvote him.

The new board probably made one of the wisest moves possible when it selected Dr. Phil H. Putnam, a veteran of three other junior college presidencies, to be the founding president and superintendent of the district.

Arriving in Whittier in late 1962, Putnam set to work organizing, planning, appearing before community groups, writing letters, and generally doing those things that were needed to sell the junior college idea to this community.

The new board selected a permanent site for the college in early 1963, a move that was accompanied by heated debate. The site selected, a hillside parcel far northwest

of the center of the district that was known as the Pellissier property, had stirred the least enthusiasm--but also the least opposition--of the three sites from which the final choice was made.

One of the other sites, located in the hills above Whittier College, was vehemently opposed by many nearby residents and privately opposed by Whittier College as well. The third site was somewhat too small for a junior college, and was situated in a Pico Rivera river lowland area that was less than aesthetically inspiring, at the least. This site also had the handicap of an unclear title, but it was wholeheartedly endorsed by the people of Pico Rivera.

In choosing the Pellissier site, the board avoided the wrath of many Whittierites, a wrath that would have been intense if the site near Whittier College had been chosen, and perhaps a little less so had the unattractive and distant Pico Rivera site been selected. However, many Pico Rivera residents expressed anger that the site in their community was bypassed, and some threatened to retaliate by opposing the fourth bond election.

(To anticipate ourselves a bit, Pico Rivera voted four to one in favor of the fourth bond issue proposal--just slightly above the percentage of the district as a whole; for comparison, this community went 66.65 per cent in favor of the third bond election, again just a little better than the vote of the entire district.)

Dr. L.A. Grandy (I3), assistant superintendent of the

district, feels certain that the site selection was not in any way a factor in the outcome of the fourth bond election, and the figures just cited support him. However, there was a great deal of hostility expressed toward the junior college by Pico Rivera leaders after their site was rejected, and one can only wonder what the vote might have been like under other circumstances.

For instance, Joe Robertson, clerk of the El Rancho Unified School Board, told a large group of Whittier area school people:

"There's considerable mixed emotion in our community about the junior college. Our issue (an El Rancho bond issue), we fear, might become confused with it and suffer; we would prefer not having the two elections at the same time." (quoted by the author in the Whittier Daily News, June 21, 1963).

This kind of feeling must have subsided in Pico Rivera before election (the junior college bond issue got a better yes percentage in Pico Rivera than that El Rancho schoolbbond issue Robertson was mentioning), and whatever residual hostility existed would have surely been worse if either of the alternate sites had been chosen.

Under Putnam's leadership, the new junior college board took several other steps that enhanced the junior college's standing with the public during early 1963.

For one thing, the district was renamed "Rio Hondo," in order to more accurately reflect the heritage of the entire area (and to satisfy another private demand of Whittier Col-

lege partisans: that the new school not be named Whittier Junior College).

Another major step toward good public relations was the board's decision to begin offering afternoon and evening classes in September, 1963, using rented high school facilities. This allowed the new junior college to become a "going concern" with a nucleus of faculty, a four-man administrative staff, and even 2000 part time students, all of whom could be instrumental when the fourth bond election campaign got underway.

In addition, the Rio Hondo board set forth clear educational and building plans before the fourth bond election. A master plan was developed, and the basic specifications of the major buildings were decided. Putnam had a large scale model of the campus built, and he went before every group that would listen, telling them, "...and here is the new library; it will be the heart of the campus."

In July of 1963, the board called the climactic bond election, setting it for Oct. 8, 1963 and specifying the amount as $12 million ($12 million, Putnam said, was the "psychological maximum" for the district).

The newly appointed administrative staff, the board, and interested lay people then launched a massive election campaign, with special committees set up to coordinate endorsements, financing, Rio Hondo student efforts, publicity, precinct work, etc.

In retrospect, Grandy feels that there were only a few ways in which the fourth campaign itself was more effective than the first three, but one of these areas of improvement reflects Turner's (11) findings. The precinct committee was set up with one 'lieutenant' for every 10 yes votes needed to overcome that seemingly constant no-vote total. This 'lieutenant' was responsible for: 1) soliciting yes-vote pledges from 10 neighbors; 2) calling on these people on election day; 3) driving them to the polls if necessary. Pledges such as this had not been solicited in the previous campaigns.

Another important angle in this campaign--indeed, this was probably the decisive one--was the wide use of the argument that "a yes vote will LOWER your taxes!" This argument had not been used to any significant extent in previous campaigns, but Rio Hondo campaigners made maximum use of it the fourth time.

Civic groups were told that by voting yes, they could keep $2 million a year "at home," provide education for nearly 5,000 young people, do something that would build the local economy, and cut the tax rate from 77 cents to 60 cents--all by voting yes on the bonds! The appeal also included frequent references to the wastefulness of paying this $300 seat tax and "rent." See, for instance, the news story in Appendix A entitled "Junior College Rental Said to Cost Taxpayers $2,000 Per Day."

Table I.

	BOND DEFEATS				BOND VICTORIES			
	Rio Hondo	San Jacto	Fre-mont	San Joaq.	Rio Hondo	San Jacto	Fre-Mont	San Joaq.
Yes Percentages	56% 66 63	44% 64 59	59%	49%	81%	68%	73%	78%
Voter Turnout (approximate)	18% 22 21	28% 45 68	75%	20%	24%	19%	65%	50%
POSITIVE FACTORS								
1. No Tax Increase? (used in campaign)	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
2. A Going Concern?	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
3. Site Selected?	NO	NO-1 YES-2	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
4. Educational, building plans final?	NO	NO	NO	-	YES	YES	YES	-
5. Key Staff There?	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
6. News Media Unanimously Supporting?	YES	NO	NO	"Luke warm"	YES	YES	YES	YES
NEGATIVE FACTORS								
1. Vocal Opposition?	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
2. Site Controversial?	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO

Another significant phenomenon in this fourth bond election campaign was the surprising silence of groups and individuals who had noisily opposed the first three bond proposals. As already noted, Whittier College declared its neutrality (in a statement from its president), and the other formerly vocal opponents were not heard from at all--at least not in public.

When this fourth bond issue went to the voters on Oct. 8, 1963, the result was a landslide--the biggest yes percentage recorded anywhere in our study. Altogether, 15,627 persons voted affirmatively, and there were just 3,768 no votes. The Rio Hondo bond issue had carried with an 80.57 per cent majority, demonstrating just what can be done with a once-hostile community when an effective campaign is waged and all of the facts would support an affirmative vote.

Perhaps the most significant point in these results is that only 3,768 persons voted no this time, roughly half as many as had consistently opposed the first three bond issues. That no-vote bloc had disintegrated.

Of all the factors we have summarized, which ones were the keys to this remarkable change in voter attitudes?

"The message (the economics) just finally sunk in," said Grandy (I3). "Many people in this community just didn't know that you had to pay for a junior college, and they didn't know they had been paying for it already. The junior college

tax rate wasn't listed separately on the property tax bill until after our third election, and the people just didn't realize how much it was already costing them," Grandy added.

Wray concurred that the key issue was the tax rate. He cited the change in state law that allowed the permissive override to remain in effect indefinitely (in the absence of a successful bond election) as the factor that "broke the backs" of the opposition.

Interestingly, this change in state law was pushed through the legislature in early 1963 by three Assemblymen from the Rio Hondo area, at the behest of Phil Putnam and the Rio Hondo board of trustees. As we will see, the indefinite-override law later benefitted all of our other sample districts, but Rio Hondo was the first to use it as a campaign argument.

Another sidelight worth noting is that this override authorization has probably been most beneficial to a district that could not be included in a study such as this one. West Valley College has yet to pass a bond election, but thanks to this law, this college district has been able to gradually develop a functional and attractive campus without a bond issue.

In our review of the Rio Hondo Junior College District's four bond campaigns, then, we have seen that several things changed between the three successful efforts and the very successful fourth effort. These decisive factors can be

summarized as follows:

1) A separate board and a full time junior college staff led by a dynamic president were on hand to direct the fourth campaign;

2) A site had been selected before the fourth campaign;

3) Educational and building plans had been specified and a model of the campus put on public display before the fourth election;

4) Vocal opposition to the junior college was neutralized the fourth time;

5) The college was a going concern with students and faculty the fourth time;

6) The argument that a bond issue would REDUCE taxes and build a local college at the same time was advanced in the fourth campaign.

We have not discussed two other factors that would ordinarily be expected to affect the outcome of a bond election because both were essentially constant rather than variable in Rio Hondo's case. But in the interest of completeness we should note that: 1) the local news media unanimously and energetically supported the college district during all four bond campaigns; and 2) the voter turnout did not vary significantly among the four elections.

* * *

B. Mt. San Jacinto Junior College District

On Dec. 12, 1961, the voters of Banning, Beaumont, Hemet, San Jacinto, and several smaller communities voted four to one in favor of forming the Mt. San Jacinto Junior College District. Although that margin is impressive, it is the opinion of most observers, including Dr. Milo P. Johnson (I4), that this vote did not particularly indicate

that the residents of these communities were anxious to have a junior college, let alone pay for one. A plan to reorganize the Riverside Junior College District so that it would include this area was being widely discussed at the time, and it seems very likely that fear of being "swallowed up" by the Riverside district was the primary impetus for that four-to-one vote in favor of forming a separate district.

In any event, all of these communities are basically rural in character: they have disproportionate populations of retired persons (including many on fixed incomes), there are relatively few middle aged families with children of high school and college age, and the forces of suburbanization have not yet reached this area.

Carter's findings (4) suggest bond election troubles for districts with this kind of demographic character, and in Mt. San Jacinto's case, Carter's conclusions proved accurate. But to further complicate matters, a bitter geography-linked feud within the district compounded the problem.

The Mt. San Jacinto district continued to send all local students out (principally to Riverside City College, College of the Desert, and San Bernardino Valley College) for two years after its formation. The first local classes were offered in the fall of 1963 in rented stores, garages, and offices scattered around the district.

The first bond election was called for Sept. 24, 1963, in the amount of $3 million (all four Mt. San Jacinto bond elections asked approval for the same amount). This election, held shortly after the first classes got underway, produced a jolting 44.4 per cent yes vote, with a turnout of about 20 per cent. The support was poor throughout the district, with only San Jacinto giving the bond issue more than 50 per cent support.

At this point, no site had been selected, and specific building and educational plans were not yet final.

However, the district called a second bond election four and a half months later, on Feb. 11, 1964. This time campaign efforts were intensified, but one other major factor probably accounted for the dramatic shift in the vote that was to come: the college accepted the conditional gift of land for a site in Gilman Hot Springs, quite close to the "valley" communities of San Jacinto and Hemet, but geographically removed from the San Gorgonio Pass communities, Banning and Beaumont.

The community reaction was predictable. The Hemet and San Jacinto areas responded to what many voters regarded as a victory in a major site selection battle by overwhelmingly supporting the second bond issue proposal. San Jacinto voted 89.8 per cent yes, and Hemet (located a little further from the site) voted 80.5 per cent yes. In both communities, the turnout was unusually high for a special

election.

However, the vote in the Pass communities was equally dramatic--in the opposite direction. Banning gave this second bond election an incredible 27.7 per cent affirmative vote, and Beaumont managed 33.6 per cent yes votes.

But since the turnout was fairly low in the Pass area, the bond issue almost carried: Banning and Beaumont were almost forced to have a college despite their overwhelming disapproval! District-wide, the yes vote totalled 63.7 per cent.

Having come this close, the Mt. San Jacinto district tried again on June 2, 1964, consolidating the third bond election with the California primary. The result, predictably, was a higher turnout and a slightly poorer showing for the bonds. This time the bond issue drew 59 per cent affirmative votes in the total district, but once again the violent geographic cleavage was evident.

On this third bond vote, San Jacinto voted 88.5 per cent yes, and Hemet went 77.2 per cent yes. In Banning, the yes percentage was up to 31.19, while Beaumont's support for the bonds increased to 34.19 per cent. The Pass area was still demonstrating its anger over the site at the polls.

Dr. Milo P. Johnson, president of the college district, recognized that the Pass portion of his dichotomous district had to be pacified before a bond election could pass.

Seeking to build ties with the Pass area, Johnson established his own residance in Banning, took an active part in

Banning civic affairs, encouraged college staff members to live in the Pass, and recruited as many students as possible from the Pass communities.

The college also set out to develop a campus on its Gilman Hot Springs site, using what financial resources could be obtained. Using 18 cents of the permissive new-district override, the district began acquiring some of the major campus buildings on a lease-purchase basis. (Fortunately, Mt. San Jacinto Junior College District does have a realtively strong tax base).

The faculty and staff were expanded, and the college began offering a small but innovative academic and technical program at Gilman Hot Springs.

By the fall of 1967, almost 500 full time students were attending classes (including some 200 from the Pass), and more than three years had elapsed since the last of the three unsuccessful bond elections. The board decided to call another bond election for two reasons: 1) there was a chance that a bond issue might pass by this time; and 2) the permissive new-district override expires if the junior college district using it does not conduct a bond election at least every four years. The board set the fourth bond election for Jan. 9, 1968.

In comparison to other school bond campaigns the author has witnessed, what followed was a remarkably low-key and subdued drive by supporters of the college.

A Patrons' Association--a body of civic leaders and laymen--had been functioning for some time, and its members campaigned for the bond issue. In addition, college board and staff members spoke to civic groups around the district, and a number of organizations endorsed the fourth bond issue proposal. But there was little publicity sought, and there was only limited work at the precinct level.

Nevertheless, a number of factors had changed in the three and a half year interval between the third and fourth bond elections, and the message the campaigners took to the community sounded impressive enough to convince the voters, even in an area as notoriously unenthusiastic about education as the San Gorgonio Pass.

There was, in fact, some evidence to suggest that the Pass was forgetting its old resentment at the Gilman Hot Springs site selection. There had been much vocal opposition to the earlier bond elections, even among the civic leaders of Banning and Beaumont, but this was not a problem the fourth time.

For instance, a group of Banning residents led by a wealthy and influential landowner, City Councilman Gene Brinton, had sought a court injunction against Johnson and the Mt. San Jacinto board of trustees prior to the third bond election. Brinton's suit accused Johnson and his board of using district funds and manpower to campaign for the earlier bond issues. The suit was dropped when the third bond issue failed, but the

junior college's foes had made their point (and in fact, this suit probably accounts for some of the subdued character of the fourth bond campaign). But if the college officials were quiet in their campaigning, Brinton and his allies were even more subdued in their opposition the fourth time--if they were in fact opposed. No one but their friends really knew.

Another major source of opposition to the first three Mt. San Jacinto bond issue proposals had been two local newspapers, the Banning-Beaumont Daily Record-Gazette, which had been very effective in stirring the Pass area's resentment toward the college, and the San Jacinto Record, which was somewhat less than effective in its circulation area.

By the time of the fourth bond election, the San Jacinto and Pass newspapers had both changed ownership. The San Jacinto paper was sold to the Hemet News, a growing and progressive newspaper that had supported the college from its early days. Meanwhile, the Scripps League, a chain organization that buys small newspapers as investments (and cares little about strictly local editorial policies), had purchased the Record-Gazette.

The former editor of the Record-Gazette, Mort Kresner, had opposed the junior college throughout his tenure. Under the Scripps League's absentee ownership, the new editor reversed the paper's position and ardently supported the college's fourth bond election, running an editorial campaign that was climaxed by a front-page endorsement the night before the election (see Appendix A).

But the most compelling new force in favor of the Mt.

San Jacinto bond issue the fourth time was undoubtedly the economic argument--the same "it-will-NOT-raise-your-taxes" case put before the Rio Hondo voters the fourth time.

By January of 1968, Mt. San Jacinto College was a going concern, with or without a bond issue. It had become clear to the most vehement foes of the college that this institution would not go away or stop levying taxes if the voters kept rejecting bond proposals.

Like Putnam at Rio Hondo, Johnson went around the district presenting figures to support his contention that it would cost the taxpayers LESS if the bond issue were to pass. Of the $3 million in bonds, Johnson pledged, $800,000 would immediately be used to purchase existing college facilities on which the district was then paying rent.

Some of the rest of the bond monies could be used as matching funds to qualify Mt. San Jacinto for federal and state construction grants. This outside aid was appropriated, and some other district would inherit it if Mt. San Jacinto couldn't qualify for it, Johnson argued. Furthermore, the cost of building the campus would have to be borne entirely by local taxpayers if the college couldn't collect these grants, he would point out.

Only 4,800 people voted in Mt. San Jacinto's fourth bond election (less than 20 per cent of those eligible and far fewer than had voted in any of the three earlier bond elections), but 68.2 per cent voted yes.

As was the case at Rio Hondo, the bond issue carried when the no-vote total finally dropped off. Only 1535 persons voted against the fourth Mt. San Jacinto bond proposal, about half of the lowest previous negative vote.

But probably the most significant change in the voting pattern that occurred on Mt. San Jacinto's fourth try was a great reduction in the Pass-Valley polarization. The Hemet-San Jacinto area still led the Pass in support for the bonds, but the dramatic contrasts of earlier elections were gone.

In this fourth bond election, Valley area support for the college declined from the 80-per cent levels of the past to 72 per cent, while Pass support more than doubled to 60 per cent affirmative.

In retrospect, Johnson (I4) feels that the economic argument was the decisive factor in Mt. San Jacinto's success on the fourth try, closely paralleling the pattern at Rio Hondo.

"I've thought about both of those (Mt. San Jacinto and Rio Hondo) many times, and I'm sure both bond issues finally passed because we could advertise that it would not now raise the taxes," Johnson said in the recent interview.

That and only that changed the vote," he declared.

Johnson said that he and his staff did everything else possible to keep the hostile vote down, but that the tax argument was the key factor.

To summarize the Mt. San Jacinto case then, we must conclude that here too the economic argument was decisive

in changing the voters' minds. However, it seems clear that several other factors contributed to the ultimate passage of a bond issue here, or at least kept the no-vote subdued. These factors include the following:

1) Mt. San Jacinto College had become a going concern with a campus, students, and curricula that could not be abolished by defeating a bond issue;

2) The Pass area's old site selection bitterness was disappearing with time, aided by the college's efforts to build ties with the Pass communities;

3) The vocal opponents of the junior college were silent the fourth time;

4) A newspaper that had rallied the Pass area in opposition to the bonds campaigned for a yes vote the fourth time;

5) The quiet campaign and lack of controversy surrounding the fourth election produced a lower turnout than in previous bond elections.

* * *

C. The Fremont-Newark Junior College District

The Fremont-Newark Junior College District, located in a growing suburban area 25 miles south of Oakland in Alameda County, is the newest district included in this study. It began operations on July 1, 1966.

The district's board of trustees, anxious to get a program under way, employed Dr. Stephen Epler as superintendent and called a $10 million bond election for Nov. 8, 1966, just four months after the district's formation. This election was consolidated with a California gubernatorial election, the only one in our study so consolidated.

Roughly 1200 local junior college students had been

attending other junior colleges, including Chabot in Hayward, West Valley in Campbell, San Jose City College, and Foothill in Los Altos Hills.

The district's promptness in getting under way with a bond election may well have contributed to the defeat suffered in that first attempt, because there was only a limited amount of time available for planning and campaigning before the election.

In any case, about 75 per cent of the district's 40,000 registered voters were attracted to the polls by the Brown-Reagan election, as well as the Congressional and legislative races, and the voters gave the new junior college district a 59 per cent yes vote.

This district had not had sufficient time to spell out its educational and building plans before the first bond election, nor had there been time to reach a site decision. And the college was definitely not a going concern then--there was no campus of any kind, no staff, and no students. The entire operation consisted of a president, a vice president, and a few clerks.

On the other hand, there was no vocal opposition of the kind Rio Hondo and Mt. San Jacinto had encountered, but there was strong community support. Dr. Holger Rasmussen, a local dentist, led a dedicated citizens' committee campaign for the bonds.

From the outset, the demographic character of this area and the lack of determined opposition suggested that this com-

munity could be expected to support a junior college bond issue under reasonably good circumstances.

After the defeat of the initial bond proposal, the Fremont-Newark board and administration continued with the process of planning a program, recruiting a staff, setting up a temporary campus, and generally organizing.

Fortunately, a surplus Catholic girls' school located near the historic Mission San Jose de Guadalupe was available, and the new district made plans to offer a full program in September of 1967, just a year after the district was formed.

The district leased the entire girls' school, including five usable permanent buildings, from the Catholic church; 10 more portable buildings were then added at the site. As had Rio Hondo and Mt. San Jacinto, the Fremont-Newark District used the permissive new-district override to pay the leasing costs.

The board selected "Ohlone," the name of an important local indian tribe in the locality, for the new college's name, and 1700 students enrolled when Ohlone College opened its doors in 1967. (This enrollment consisted primarily of first-time college students, since the district allowed students who had completed 24 or more units at neighboring junior colleges to continue going out of the district, even though this meant excess tuition and seat tax costs. This is, of course, a fairly common procedure for a new college

offering a regular program for the first time.)

The Fremont-Newark board called another bond election, this one in the amount of $11,135,000 (five per cent of the district's assessed valuation and thus the maximum bond issue allowed under California law). The election was scheduled for June 4, 1968, the date of the California presidential primary.

This time, college officials and laypeople ran a massive campaign, one reminiscent of and frankly inspired by Rio Hondo's very successful fourth bond campaign. Epler had once been Phil Putnam's superior at Portland State College, and before Putnam's untimely death in 1966 the two had discussed the Rio Hondo campaign at length.

The dentist Rasmussen once again organized the lay campaign effort, but this time he had more volunteers, more money, and much better campaign materials. The multi-faceted campaign included an endorsement drive, a campaign for large contributions from civic leaders and businessmen, voluminous publicity, precinct work, and student efforts.

Amidst this bond campaign, Fremont-Newark's board selected a site for the proposed campus. A large and scenic hillside parcel near the old Mission, the site was on Huddleson Ranch property and turned out to be a thoroughly non-controversial choice. However, an architectural firm that had recommended against this site so angered some citizens' committee members that they threatened to oppose

the upcoming bond election if the board didn't get a different architect!

As at Rio Hondo and Mt. San Jacinto, the strongest argument in favor of the Fremont-Newark bond proposal was undoubtedly the familiar appeal to the taxpayers:

"A yes vote will LOWER your taxes."

The major brochures emphasized this argument, and the story was told repeatedly to civic and community groups. In addition, nearly 100 professionally printed street signs were posted around the district, and during the last week of the campaign a line was added to these posters flatly declaring that the bond issue "will not raise taxes". This argument had not been emphasized at all in the earlier bond campaign.

Specifically, the tax argument in this district was that within three years after bonds were approved the district would be required by law to discontinue the new-district override. Since the bond redemption tax rate would never be as high as the new-district override, the voters were told they would be certain to gain a seven cent tax reduction after the 1971-72 fiscal year.

Another factor that may have contributed to the success of the second bond election was the press support. During the first bond campaign, only one of the two local daily newspapers (the News Register) had endorsed the bond issue. The other paper, the Argus, opposed it.

But in the second election, both endorsed the bonds.

"I think the Argus recognized that the college was a

going thing and that the power structure was supporting us. They saw which way the wind was blowing," Epler said (I2).

Epler feels that the Argus' opposition may have cost the district three or four percentage points in the first election. This is a significant factor, but not by itself decisive, since the first bond election was rejected by about seven per cent.

When the results were tabulated on June 4, 1968, the Fremont-Newark district had received 19,827 votes in favor of its $11.1 million bond issue, with only 7,397 negative votes, for a 73 per cent majority. In view of the statewide "taxpayers' revolt" and the 68 per cent turnout, this vote would seem to indicate the effectiveness of the second campaign and the strength of that "lower taxes" argument.

"Basically, we just worked harder the second time," Epler recalled, summarizing his analysis of why the second bond election ran 14 percentage points ahead of the first.

But in addition to hard work, it seems that the following factors contributed to the change in election results in the Fremont-Newark district:

1) The college was a <u>going concern</u> with students, faculty, a campus (albeit a makeshift one), and a full program the second time;

2) The argument that passing the bonds would NOT raise taxes was used the second time;

3) The one notable source of opposition in the first election campaign, a newspaper, reversed its stand and endorsed the second bond proposal;

4) A dynamic, well-funded, and efficient campaign organization secured key endorsements, saturated the district with publicity, and then got out the vote.

* * *

D. The San Joaquin Junior College District

The San Joaquin (Delta) Junior College District is new, having been formed July 1, 1963, but it inherited an old established junior college from the Stockton Unified School District. Consequently, some of the circumstances surrounding this district's bond election defeat and subsequent victory (on the second attempt) are not comparable to the circumstances at the other three districts in our study, since the other districts were carved entirely out of "free territory" (and had to start at the very beginning in building a community college). Nevertheless, we also found many things in common as we studied the bond elections here and compared them to those in the three brand-new districts.

When it was formed in 1963, the San Joaquin district retained possession (by a lease arrangement with Stockton Unified) of the 28-year-old Stockton College campus. What the new district inherited was a 43-acre facility that was rapidly becoming overcrowded, a full-time student population of 3,000, and a full faculty and staff. A number of the initial decisions facing new districts could thus be avoided--or at least deferred--in this district.

As reorganized, the San Joaquin district includes

San Joaquin County, / and portions of Sacramento County, Alameda County and Solano County. The cities it serves include Stockton, Lodi, Rio Vista, etc.

At the time of this district's formation, plans for a major expansion (and abandonment of the old Stockton College facility) were widely publicized, and a bond election was called in 1965 to finance this expansion program. Held in early November of that year, the election sought voter approval of a $22.7 million bond issue, and the election was consolidated with a $9 million Stockton Unified bond election. Thus, the voters in a large part of the junior college district were asked to approve almost $32 million in school bonds on one day, and a lot of voters balked--more than half of them.

With a 20 per cent turnout, this first San Joaquin bond issue received just 49 per cent yes votes.

Dr. Mario K. Bandley (I1), a veteran San Joaquin Delta College administrator, attributed the defeat to several factors. One of the major ones was that, just as $12 million was the "psychological maximum" for a Rio Hondo bond issue (in Putnam's judgment), $20 million must have been the "psychological maximum" in San Joaquin County.

"There is apparently some significance to keeping the bond issue below the $20 million figure in this county. Apparently some people felt the new district had committed itself to build for $20 million (at the time of the district's formation), and that this $22.7 million was a breach of faith," Dr. Bandley explained.

In addition, there was some organized opposition to the first San Joaquin bond election. For instance, several members of a local taxpayers' group made statements in the press attacking the first bond proposal just before election day.

The enrollment of San Joaquin Delta College has grown rapidly in the past few years. There were 5,200 day students in 1968-69, compared to the total of 3,000 four years earlier. To handle this growth without a bond issue, the district was leasing increasing numbers of portable buildings to put on the leased campus, using the new-district override to pay these leasing costs. By the 1968-69 year, college administrators were projecting the enrollment still further upward and predicting that it would be more costly to stay on the old campus than to move by 1973.

After this lengthy wait, then, the San Joaquin board called another bond election for March 4, 1969. Having faced considerable criticism of the amount of the earlier bond issue proposal, the board discreetly set this one for $19,850,000.

Many circumstances changed in the four-year interim between San Joaquin bond elections. Not the least noteworthy was the arrival in Stockton of Dr. Julio Bortolazzo, a man who, like Putnam at Rio Hondo, was a veteran junior college president and a leading figure in the movement be-

fore he took the position that brought him into our study. Bortolazzo was brought into the San Joaquin district when Burke Bradley, president of Stockton College since its unified district days, retired.

A gifted leader and organizer, Bortolazzo worked "an 18-hour day for the bond election," according to Bandley. Bortolazzo's career bond election record was a monumental 17 successes and one failure when he arrived in Stockton. He aggressively pursued success number 18.

Another important change between bond elections was the selection of a popular site for the proposed new campus, a 165-acre parcel of the best land at Stockton's 700-acre mental hospital facility.

At the time of the first bond election, the board had made no final site commitment, but it was considering two sites, both of them controversial. One was on mental hospital land, but not a particularly attractive piece of it, and the other was on property owned by the grandson of Stockton founder Charles Weber.

Since Weber had only recently had another parcel of his land condemned by the county, there was strong sentiment in some circles against any more condemnation of Weber lands. However, there was also some feeling in the community that the Weber property should be condemned to avoid an undesirable state hospital site.

In the interim between bond elections, a far more attractive parcel of hospital land was declared surplus,

and there was no opposition to its selection as a junior college site.

Of course, another changed circumstance that had to affect the outcome of the second bond election was the fact that the overcrowding at the existing campus had become much more conspicuous. It is once again significant that college officials were able to project that it would cost MORE to stay on the present campus than to move.

This argument, coupled with a pledge that the bond issue would not be allowed to increase taxes, constituted an economic argument not unlike those advanced by our three brand-new districts--even though San Joaquin had not been paying any seat taxes or sending its students out of town to go to school.

The news media also supported the second bond election more forcefully than the first. There was no direct opposition to the first proposal, but Bandley characterized much of the support as "lukewarm." On the other hand, all of the local press, plus the electronic media, strongly endorsed the second bond election.

Another factor in the second election was undoubtedly the campaign approach. More and better brochures were circulated by direct mail, there were more speakers sent out, and San Joaquin County was saturated with lawn signs. College officials worked hard to prevent organized opposition and to secure civic support.

"We just didn't let opposition grow. We sought out and talked to anyone who could possibly oppose it; we met with every group we could," Bandley said.

The local service clubs, the chambers of commerce, and the full Taxpayers' Association supported the second San Joaquin bond proposal, indicating the effectiveness of this approach.

"We got the whole area involved in the second campaign, and we kept the communication channels open," he added. "No one was ignorant this time. Everyone knew when the election was."

A look at the results of this second San Joaquin bond election tends to support these claims. This was a special election--consolidated with nothing else--but it drew a 50 per cent voter turnout and gained a 78.3 per cent affirmative vote in 1969, the year of bond and tax election failures unparalleled since the depression.

Altogether, 42,026 voters supported the second San Joaquin bond election; only 11,648 opposed it.

In summary, we can conclude that a number of factors contributed to the striking contrast between the first and second San Joaquin Junior College District bond elections. These factors may be summarized by the following observations:

1) The voters could be told that it would eventually cost less to pass a bond issue and build a new campus than it would to continue the present arrangement, and that a yes vote would NOT raise taxes;

2) The second election followed a much more

intensive campaign than the first--a campaign that emphasized personal contacts and good communications. The second campaign, additionally, was organized by one of the junior college movement's most effective electioneers;

3) The second bond election elicited no opposition that could not be neutralized by college officials who sought dialog with anyone who questioned the need for a bond issue;

4) A site acceptable to the entire community had been selected before the second election;

5) The amount of the second bond issue was set below $20 million.

6) The news media supported the second bond election more forcefully.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have seen several patterns emerging in the bond election success and failure experiences of our four sample districts. In most respects, these patterns are consistent with the 'a priori' expectations we drew from a review of the literature.

Probably the most significant overall finding of this study is the degree to which California's permissive new-district override tax is decisive in the development of new junior college districts. Only when the voters have realized that they would face this excess tax indefinitely if bond elections were to continue failing--and only when the point that a bond issue would not raise taxes was emphasized--did our four districts win bond elections. In all four districts, this 'no tax increase' argument was a major feature

of the successful bond campaign. It should be noted that none of the eight unsuccessful bond campaigns focused on this issue.

Second, all four junior colleges were going concerns with students, faculty, and full administrative staffs when they finally passed bond issues. Only one (San Joaquin) could really have been called a going concern at the time of its bond defeat.

Third, controversy and vocal opposition were notably absent from all four successful bond campaigns (this supports hypothesis B). All four districts had succeeded in neutralizing earlier opposition before their successful bond campaigns. Further, sites had been selected and the site issue settled by the time of all four bond victories. Three of the districts had not selected sites at the time of the bond failures, while a hotly controversial site decision had been reached in the fourth district. (The site issue was also controversial, although no decision had been reached, during another of the unsuccessful campaigns.)

In all four districts, the successful bond elections were unanimously and wholeheartedly endorsed by the local news media, supporting hypothesis D. In three of the four districts, bond failures were associated with less than full support from the media.

Our findings also tend to support hypothesis A, which predicts that personal contact between college person-

nel and the community will improve chances for passage of a bond election. Three of the four successful bond elections followed exceptionally vigorous and dynamic campaigns that emphasized good communications with the community. In the fourth successful election campaign, college officials strived to prevent opposition from developing and were readily accessible, although this campaign was a quiet, low-key effort not designed to elicit a high turnout.

Another relevant factor in this personal contact area is that since all four districts had become going concerns before they passed their bond elections, all four were able to utilize the personal contacts of students and faculty as well as administrators to build bridges to the voters (as suggested by Carter).

In regard to hypothesis E (the relationship of demographic variables to bond success), our findings were not conclusive. One district we studied (Mt. San Jacinto) can be shown to rank higher in the proportion of Carter's 'no' voters within its population than the other three districts, but this difference in demographic character was not clearly related to election results. Mt. San Jacinto's ultimate yes vote on the fourth try was significantly lower than the final affirmative percentages in the other three districts (only 68.2 per cent), and the yes percentage was the lowest of any of our 12 elections on Mt. San Jacinto's first try. However, the second and third Mt. San Jacinto elections were almost identical to Rio Hondo's second and

third elections, in terms of percentages voting yes.

Our findings were also inconclusive in regard to hypothesis C (the effect of voter turnout). The Fremont-Newark district lost one bond election with an exceptionally high turnout, but then passed another with a similar turnout. San Joaquin lost decisively with a 20 per cent turnout, but then won decisively with a turnout of nearly 50 per cent.

One Mt. San Jacinto bond proposal, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly rejected in a low-turnout situation, while the next two approached two-thirds support with much higher turnouts. But the successful fourth Mt. San Jacinto election attracted the lowest turnout of the four.

Therefore, we have no evidence to either support or question the findings of Carter's massive empirical study of voter turnout. And to reiterate, we would be most hesitant to question Carter with our small purposive sample, regardless of our findings. We can only say that, if other circumstances are right, a junior college bond issue can be carried with a 20 per cent voter turnout--or with a 70 per cent turnout. By the same token, a bond election can lose with a 20 per cent or a 70 per cent turnout, if other circumstances are unfavorable. The turnout did not appear to be the decisive factor in the bond elections we studied.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Although we cannot make inferences to the larger population of junior college districts with statistical

confidence, several recommendations seem appropriate at this juncture. Based on our study of 12 bond elections in four new junior college districts, we would suggest that other new districts contemplating a bond election:

1) Make tax rates the key issue in the bond campaign. From the formation of the district, make sure the public is aware of the permissive override (and why this excess tax is necessary).

2) Become a <u>going concern</u> before the bond election if at all possible. Select a site for the campus (ideally, a noncontroversial site), plan the college's curriculum and building program, recruit the nucleus of the staff, and start offering classes somewhere before calling a bond election, if it is feasible.

3) Avoid controversy of all kinds in the period leading up to the bond election. If there is vocal opposition to the junior college, endeavor to neutralize it before attempting to pass a bond issue.

4) Secure the support of as many community leaders, civic groups, and news media as possible before launching a bond campaign. Keep the lines of communications to these key elements in the power structure open.

5) Conduct a broadly based campaign that emphasizes personal contact between college personnel and the public whenever possible.

* * * * *

Pages 52-59

APPENDIX A

(Note: It was not possible to provide complete sets of Xerox copies of the materials to be included in this section for all 100 copies of this paper).

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B. Interviews

I1. Interview with Dr. Mario K. Bandley, executive assistant to the president, San Joaquin Delta College, August 8, 1969.

I2. Interview with Dr. Stephen Epler, president and superintendent, Fremont-Newark Junior College District, July 30, 1969.

I3. Interview with Dr. L.A. Grandy, assistant superintendent, business, Rio Hondo Junior College District, August 5, 1969.

I4. Interview with Dr. Milo P. Johnson, president and superintendent, Mt. San Jacinto Junior College District, July 25, 1969.

I5. Interview with Judge Merton G. Wray, board member, Rio Hondo Junior College District, August 7, 1969.

I6. The most productive source of information for this paper is listed here as I6, in the interest of providing a complete summary of the references consulted. This source consists of the author's many hours of consultation with junior college officials, board meetings attended, and news stories published in his role of newsman covering the junior college field.